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1Introduction 
 
In any macroeconometric model the wage equation is of crucial importance. Indeed, the wage 
equation largely determines the macroeconomic impact of taxes and social benefits. 
Unfortunately, theoretical notions and empirical studies do not agree in this respect. Theoretical 
models of wage setting suggest that employers' and employees' tax rates and VAT-rates should 
exert the same impact on wages. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, 1994) suggest that the tax 
wedge exerts no long-term influence on wage costs whatsoever. This contrasts to many empiri-
cal studies. For example, testing a macro wage equation for ten OECD countries, Knoester and 
Van der Windt (1987) find that the employers' and employees' tax rate have a significant impact 
on wage costs in the case of Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. For the United Kingdom, Layard and Nickell (1986) find that 
only the labour tax rate of employers affects wages. 
 Also on how the replacement rate affects wages, theoretical and empirical studies come 
to different conclusions. Theoretical studies provide abundant support for such an influence. 
However, the empirical evidence is scarce and mixed. Most empirical studies do not detect any 
significant effect, although some do find a rather large impact (see Table 1). 
 This paper develops a theoretical wage bargaining model, which yields a non-linear wage 
equation with a positive long term impact of taxes on wages as a special case. The elasticity of 
the replacement rate depends on the unemployment rate. The wage equation is estimated on 
time series data of the Netherlands. By distinguishing between short-term and long-term 
coefficients, we reconcile the divergence between theoretical predictions and empirical 
estimates of various components in the tax wedge. The last section summarizes the main 
findings and reviews some policy implications. 
 
2 Derivation of the wage equation 
Tabel 1 Estimates of the replacement rate elasticity in wage equations 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
─ 
study country  estimate 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
─ 
Minford (1983) United Kingdom 0.6 
Layard and Nickell (1986) United Kingdom 0.18 
Nickell (1987) United Kingdom 0.15 to 0.35 
Manning (1993) United Kingdom 0.18 to 0.21 
Central Planning Bureau (1992) Netherlands  0.15 
Lever (1991) Netherlands  0.17 
Graafland (1992a, 1992b) Netherlands  0.31 
Calmfors (1990) Norway, Sweden 0 
 Denmark  0 to 0.28 
 Finland  0.18 
Christensen and Knudsen (1992) Denmark  0.05 
Dolado, Malo de Molina and Zabalza (1986) Spain  0.45 
Adams and Coe (1990) USA  0.05 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
─ 
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The wage equation is derived from a wage bargaining model for a representative employer and 
employee. The outcome of the wage bargain is described by the maximization of the following 
Nash-function: 
where Π and V denote the employer's and employee's utility, respectively, and α represents the 
relative bargaining power of the employer. The employer's utility equals the operating profits 
generated by the employee. These operating profits are given by the value added price (P) times 
labor productivity (q) minus wage costs per employee (W):1 
The employee's utility corresponds to the surplus from working, which is the net wage offered 
by the employer minus the opportunity costs of taking the job (i.e. the reservation wage). Let T 
denote the total taxes and social premiums per employee. Define t as T/w, that is, t is the 
average tax and social premium rate. The employee's utility is then: 
where _ stands for the reservation wage. The reservation wage is a weighted average of the 
opportunity wage in the official labor market (_o) and that in the informal sector (_b): 
The opportunity wage in the official labor market depends on the expected wage of other jobs 
and on the unemployment benefit. The reason is that the employee generally spends some time 
in unemployment before finding an alternative job. Income during unemployment equals the 
replacement rate (R) times the macro wage2. The expected wage of other jobs equals the macro 
wage rate (W). The time spent unemployed before finding an alternative job is assumed to be 
equal to the unemployment rate u . This gives: 
Instead of looking for another job on the official labor market, the employee can withdraw from 
the official labor market and seek work in the informal sector. The informal labour market 
                                                 
1
  Total profits are given by operating profits minus some unspecified sunk costs. These could, for example, be 
hiring costs or capital costs. These sunk costs create quasi rents that make the bargaining necessary. They also generate 
unemployment as a necessary force to reduces the union wage claims to a level compatible with general equilibrium, 
that is a level such that the firms' operating profits are high enough to cover the sunk costs. 
2
  In case of social insurance, the unemployment benefit is related to the previous wage and in case of government 
assistance to the macro wage. For a representative worker, the previous wage equals the macro wage. 
max arg(W): Ω = ΠαV1 - α    0<α<1 (1) 
Π = P q - W (2) 
V = W(1-t) - W (3) 
W = βW
o
 + (1-β)Wb (4) 
W
o
 =  u R W (1-t) + (1- u)W (1-t) (5) 
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consists of home production and the underground labor market. In both sectors no taxes are 
levied. The Social Cultural Planning Bureau (1995) reports that, on average, men spend 8 hours 
a week on home production and women 24 hours a week. Black labour supply of men and 
women equals less than one hour a week. Hence, home production forms the greatest share of 
informal labour supply. It is assumed that informal labor productivity is proportionally related 
to formal labor productivity (q), because technological progress in the official sector generally 
also improves labor productivity in the informal sector. The informal output price is also related 
to the formal consumer price (Pc), because home production is often performed to save official 
consumer outlays.3 This gives: 
γ is added to allow for the relatively low productivity in the informal labor market compared to 
the official labor market.4 
 After substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (1) and deriving the first-order 
condition for the Nash solution, we arrive at the following wage equation: 
where tm denotes the marginal tax rate, defined as dT/dw. Equation (7) shows that the wage 
outcome strikes a balance between the threat points of both bargaining parties. If the employer 
dominates bargaining (α=1), the employee is driven back to his threat point and the wage 
equals the reservation wage. If the employee dominates bargaining (α=0), in contrast, 
employer's utility is zero and the wage equals the producer price times labor productivity. Since 
a wage contract will be concluded only if the maximum wage offer (P q) exceeds the minimum 
wage claim (_), equation (7) implies that the marginal tax rate unambiguously reduces the wage. 
At a given average tax rate a rise in the marginal tax rate implies that the government absorbs a 
larger share of a wage increase. Hence, increasing wages becomes less attractive for the 
employee (Hersoug, 1984; Hersoug et al., 1986; Hansen, 1996).5 
                                                 
3
  Alternatively, one could let the output price of the informal sector be equal to the value added price times 1 plus 
the indirect tax rate, or equivalently, the consumer price with the terms of trade effect taken out. 
4
  An alternative way of including the informal sector in the threat point of the employee is to assume that 
unemployed persons do not withdraw from the official labour market but earn some informal income in addition to the 
unemployment benefit they receive. Then, the threat point is specified as: 
_ = u (RW  (1-t) + δ q Pc) + (1 - u)W  (1-t). This alternative equation implies that the impact of the informal sector 
on the threat point of the employee depends on the unemployment rate. 
5
  In this aspect the wage bargaining model differs from the demand-supply equilibrium model, in which wages 
follow from equilibrium between labour demand and labour supply. In this type of model, the marginal tax rate raises 
wage costs, because it decreases labour supply (See Graafland, 1991). 
Wb = γ q Pc        γ < 1 (6) 
Error! (7) 
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 To derive the wage equation to be estimated, we use the equilibrium condition W=W. 
After substitution of equations (4) to (6) into equation (7) and some rewriting, we arrive at: 
Equation (8) implies that, at a given marginal tax rate (tm), the average tax rate (t), unam-
biguously raises the wage. Intuitively, taxes raise the relative attractiveness of working in the 
informal sector, thereby improving the bargaining position of the employee. In addition, 
equation (8) reveals that various components of the average tax rate exert the same effect on 
wages in the long run. The same holds true for the sum of the average and marginal tax rate and 
the ratio of the consumer price to the value added price (consisting of the terms of trade and 
indirect tax effect).6 A third implication of equation (8) is that wage effects of the replacement 
rate and unemployment rate are interrelated. If unemployment is low, spells of unemployment 
are only short. Hence, the unemployment benefit level does not affect the alternative wage in 
the official sector much.7 The influence of the unemployment rate on wages diminishes with 
the level of the replacement rate, becoming zero if the replacement rate equals one. A final 
implication of equation (8) is that labor productivity affects wages with a unitary elasticity. 
 If the informal economy is irrelevant for the threat point of the employee (β=1), equation 
(8) can be simplified to: 
The consumer price vanishes and the tax rate affects the wage only insofar changes in the 
average tax rate differ from changes in the marginal tax rate. 
 
3  Estimation results 
                                                 
6
  Note that if we had used the consumer price with the terms of trade effect taken out, as suggested in footnote 3, 
the terms of trade would also disappear from equation (8). The term Pc/P would then reduce to 1 plus the indirect tax 
rate.  
7
  If the threat point is specified as in footnote 4, the wage effect of the tax wedge depends also on the unem-
ployment rate. However, our empirical tests rejected the hypothesis that the wage effect of the tax wedge depends on 
the unemployment rate. 
Error! (8) 
Error! (9) 
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The data are based on the National Accounts of Statistics Netherlands and given in the 
appendix. The estimation period is restricted to the period from 1967 to 1993, because data of 
the replacement rate are not available for the period before 1965. Data of the tax rate relate to 
the median worker.8 Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller test statistics (see Graafland 
and Huizinga (1988) and Graafland (1992b)) indicate that all variables included in equation (8) 
are integrated of the first order (some even of the second order). 
 Equation (8) is estimated in two alternative ways. First, we used NLS for a direct 
estimation of the wage level equation as specified in equation (8). Because of the long term 
character of equation (8), all variables are unlagged. In order to test for stationarity of the 
residual, we use the Durbin Watson and the LM test statistics. The advantage of this method is 
that the number of estimated coefficients is relatively small. 
 Second, we used 2SLS to estimate the wage equation in an error correction form, 
specified as: 
The first terms considers the short-term effects (φi) of the explanatory variables (Xi). To deal 
with simultaneity between the growth in wage, producer price, consumer price, labour produc-
tivity and unemployment, we employ one year lagged values and import prices as instrumental 
variables. For the tax wedge we allowed the short term influence of the social premium rate 
paid by employers to differ from that of the rate of direct taxes and social premiums paid by 
employees. Also the short term effects of the replacement ratio's for social insurance benefits 
and for social assistance are separately estimated. The last term in equation (10) captures the 
error correction term defined as the difference between last years's wage level and the long term 
wage level as specified by equation (8). The advantage of this second method is that it tends to 
reduce the finite sample bias in the estimated long-run coefficients (see e.g. Banerjee et al., 
1993, pp 214-23) and allows a simulateous estimate of the long term and short term effects. 
                                                 
8
  Empirical tests showed this definition to be more relevant than the average tax wedge of all employees. This might 
reflect that, at the time of wage bargaining, unions have no full information about the average tax wedge of all workers 
and use the tax wedge of the median worker instead. Another explanation is that the tax wedge of the median worker 
better represents the tax wedge of the average union member if union members disproportionally consist of low 
income workers. 
∆logW = Σφi∆logXi - η(logW-1 - logW*-1)             0<η<1 (10) 
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Tabel 2 Estimation results 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
─ 
 (1)  (2) 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
─ 
long term coefficientsa 
 
α 0.953 (66.9) 0.949 (126.9) 
β 0.940 (48.9) 0.953 (118.6) 
δ 0.025 (5.4) 0.017 (10.4) 
ε 0.741 (2.2) 0.704 (4.9) 
 
short term coefficientsa 
 
_ log Pc   0.305 (3.2) 
_ log(1-s)   -0.683 (3.6) 
_ log(1-tl)   -0.338 (5.3) 
_ log(1-tm)   0.193 (4.9) 
 
_ log P   0.436 (4.5) 
_ log q   0.213 (3.9) 
 
_ log Rs   0.112 (3.6) 
_ log Rlb   0.181 (4.3) 
 
log W - log W*   0.616 (9.2) 
 
statistics 
 
R0.999  0.999 
Adjusted standard error (*100)1.815  0.382 
Durbin Watson coefficient1.678  2.243 
LM(2)2.210 [p=0.13] 1.380 [p=0.29] 
ARCH(2)0.450 [p=0.80] 0.990 [p=0.61] 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
─ 
Symbols 
W wage cost 
Pcconsumer price 
semployer's social premium rate (as a rate of wage costs) 
tlemployee's tax and social premium rate (as a rate of gross wages) 
tmmarginal tax and social premium rate 
Pvalue added price 
qlabour productivity 
Rsreplacement ratio of social insurance benefits 
Rlreplacement ratio of social assistance 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
─ 
a
 t-values between parenthesis 
b
 One year lagged 
3 Long-run elasticities in different subperiods 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
─ 
period   1966-1975   1975-1985   1985-1993 
 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
─
average tax ratea 0.58 0.51 0.63 0.56 0.68 0.62 
marginal tax rateb -0.12 -0.15 -0.07 -0.12 -0.10 -0.16 
consumer price 0.46 0.36 0.56 0.44 0.58 0.46 
producer price 0.54 0.64 0.44 0.56 0.42 0.54 
replacement rate 0.09 0.10 0.34 0.37 0.45 0.49 
unemployment ratec -2.18 -2.38 -1.59 -1.76 -2.24 -2.47 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
─ 
a
 (∂W/W)/(∂t/(1-t) 
b
 (∂W/W)/(∂tm/(1-tm) 
c
 semi-elasticity, defined as (∂W/W)/∂u 
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  Table 2 presents the estimation results. The LM(2) test is a F-test on the joint 
significance of the one and twice lagged residuals. The DW-test and the LM(2) test do not 
reject the null-hypothesis of zero autocorrelation. The Arch(2) test gives no indication of 
heteroskedasticity. Commenting on the long-term coefficients, we see no large differences 
between the estimated structural coefficients in the first and second column. Wage bargaining 
seems to be almost fully dominated by the employer, α equals 0.95. Furthermore, the threat 
point of the employee is almost fully related to the opportunity wage in the official labour 
market. Still, β significantly differs from 1. This implies that the threat point of the employee is 
also influenced by the opportunity wage in the informal sector. The value of the coefficient of 
the consumer price (δ/(1-α+δ) can be calculated at 0.35 (with t-value 9.4) respectively 0.25 
(with t-value 11.4). Hence, the tax wedge is found to exert a significant positive long term 
impact on wages. This result contrasts with Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, 1994), who 
argue that taxes exert no long-term effect on wage costs. The estimates of α, β and δ further 
imply that the ratio between the productivity in the informal sector and official sector (γ) varies 
from 0.43 (with t-value 1.9) in the first column to 0.38 (with t-value 4.1) in the second column. 
These values fit with the relative low productivity in the informal sector. The interpretation of ε 
is less straightforward because this coefficient also corrects for differences in scaling of the 
other explanatory variables. 
 From these results, the elasticities of the average and marginal tax rate, the consumer and 
producer price, the replacement ratio and the unemployment rate can be calculated (see Table 3). 
For the tax rates and the consumer and producer price these elasticities show only little vari-
ation over the estimation period. In the first column the elasticity of the average tax rate is, on 
average, seven times larger than the (absolute value of the) elasticity of the marginal tax rate. In 
the second column the elasticity of the average tax rate is four times larger than the (absolute 
value of the) elasticity of the marginal tax rate. The negative wage effect of the marginal tax 
rate is supported by other studies for the United Kingdom (Lockwood and Manning, 1993), 
Italy (Malcomson and Sartor, 1987) and other OECD countries (Tyrväinen, 1994; Hansen et. al., 
1995; Lockwood et. al., 19959; Wikström et. al., 1996). Furthermore, the interdependence 
between unemployment rate and replacement rate implies that the elasticities of the 
replacement rate and the unemployment rate have varied considerably over time. At the low 
unemployment rates during the sixties, the replacement rate did not generate much wage 
pressure. The rise in unemployment rate during the seventies increased the effect of the 
replacement rate on wages, reaching its peak after the recession in the beginning of the eighties. 
In the nineties, the impact of replacement rate on wages diminishes, but it is still well above the 
level in the seventies. The (semi) elasticity of the unemployment rate varies inversely with the 
replacement rate, which has increased from 0.72 in 1966 to 0.83 in 1974 and has fallen since 
then to 0.70 in 1993. Finally, it is noted that the average value of the (semi) elasticity of 
unemployment is rather high. In most previous research for the Netherlands this elasticity varies 
                                                 
9
  Lockwood et. al. (1995) find a negative impact of tax progressivity on wages for middle income groups, but a 
positive impact for (male white collar) high income earners and (female) low income earners. 
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from -0.7 in Gelauff and Graafland (1994) to -1.4 in Graafland and Verbruggen (1993). Partly 
this difference is explained by the non-linear specification used in this paper. If we estimate a 
linearized specification of equation (8), the (semi) elasticity of the unemployment rate drops 
from -2 to -1.5. 
 For the short-term coefficients in the second column, we find that the effect of the emplo-
yers' rate of social premiums on wage growth exceeds that of the consumer price or employees' 
tax and social premium rate (although the difference is not significant). This is consistent with 
other studies on Dutch wages (Fase et al, 1990; Central Planning Bureau, 1992; Graafland, 
1991, 1992a; Graafland and Verbruggen, 1993). The relatively large influence of employers' 
social premium rates on wage costs can be explained by institutional aspects of wage 
bargaining. In the Netherlands, collective bargaining concludes contracts for the gross wage 
(e.g. wage costs excluding social premiums paid by employers). If the gross wage is fixed, an 
unanticipated increase in the employers' tax rate will, in the short run, cause a similar change in 
wage costs. An unexpected increase in the employees' tax rate, in contrast, is absorbed by 
workers in terms of a lower net wage. In this way, unexpected changes in the employers' and 
employees' tax rate imply different short-run effects on wage costs. However, these effects due 
to nominal contracting are not likely to persist in the long run. 
 Significant short-term effects on wage growth are also found for the producer price, 
labour productivity and the replacement ratio of both government assistance and social 
insurance. The latter two coefficients are more or less equal. We did not find any short-term 
effect of the unemployment rate and thus dropped it. However, the high value of the 
error-correction term implies a strong feedback from last year's divergences from the long-term 
wage level. Almost two thirds of the difference between last year's actual wage level and the 
preferred long-term wage level is reversed within a year. Indeed, within three years, 90 % of the 
convergence towards the long-term wage level is realized. 
 
4Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This paper estimates a non-linear wage equation for the Netherlands. The long-term equation is 
derived from a wage bargaining model in which the threat point of employees involves income 
earned in the untaxed informal sector. The model implies that the various components of the tax 
wedge exert the same impact on wage costs. Wages depend also on the consumer price, the 
producer price, labour productivity, the unemployment rate and the replacement rate. The ways 
the latter two variables affect wages are related. In particular, the wage pressures generated by 
the replacement rate rise with the unemployment rate. Furthermore, the moderating influence of 
unemployment on wages falls with the replacement rate. 
 Estimation results for the Netherlands show a highly significant long-term impact of the 
tax wedge on wages. The implied elasticity of the average tax rate is about 0.5. The marginal 
tax rate exerts a small negative impact on wages of -0.1. Both elasticities are more or less stable 
over the estimation period (1967-1993). The elasticity of the replacement rate and 
unemployment rate, in contrast, show a large variation. The elasticity of the replacement ratio 
increases from 0.1 during the sixties to over 0.4 in the eighties. The semi-elasticity of the 
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unemployment rate varies from -1.5 during the second half of the seventies to -2.5 during the 
first half of the nineties. 
 Estimation of the dynamic effects shows that the employers' social premium rate exerts a 
substantial impact on wages costs in the short run, which is twice as large as the short-term 
wage effect of the employees' tax and social premium rate. However, the large impact is 
short-lived, because the estimated error correction mechanism implies that the wage rapidly 
converges towards its long-term level. 
 The findings in this paper yield important policy implications. First, the significant long- 
term influence of the tax wedge on wage costs implies that tax policy affects equilibrium 
unemployment. This conclusion contrasts with Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, 1994), who 
argue that the tax wedge leaves equilibrium unemployment unaffected. The negative influence 
of the marginal tax rate implies that tax base broadening - i.e. reducing marginal rates while 
leaving average rates unaffected - raises wage costs. In the short run, a decrease in the 
employers' social premium rate seems to be the most effective instrument to moderate wages. 
The estimation results further suggest that at high levels of unemployment a reduction in 
unemployment benefits is particularly effective in reducing wage costs. 
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Appendix  Data 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
───── 
 W Pc  P  q  t  s  tl  tm  u  Rs  Rl  
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
───── 
1965 0.162 0.314 0.388 0.423 0.348 0.144 0.233 0.335 0.006 81.805 63.400 
1966 0.180 0.331 0.402 0.435 0.363 0.158 0.238 0.352 0.008 82.398 63.860 
1967 0.196 0.340 0.411 0.466 0.373 0.165 0.244 0.410 0.017 79.289 61.450 
1968 0.213 0.349 0.419 0.500 0.390 0.178 0.252 0.427 0.015 81.340 63.040 
1969 0.241 0.370 0.440 0.535 0.402 0.181 0.263 0.460 0.011 86.166 66.780 
1970 0.272 0.386 0.454 0.569 0.408 0.183 0.270 0.468 0.010 83.637 64.820 
1971 0.310 0.417 0.484 0.589 0.432 0.190 0.291 0.476 0.013 85.608 65.470 
1972 0.348 0.451 0.524 0.619 0.444 0.193 0.305 0.494 0.020 84.146 65.620 
1973 0.404 0.490 0.558 0.667 0.473 0.211 0.324 0.490 0.021 86.276 66.450 
1974 0.467 0.537 0.596 0.702 0.488 0.216 0.340 0.520 0.024 91.813 70.090 
1975 0.526 0.591 0.645 0.690 0.483 0.215 0.336 0.520 0.032 90.197 75.410 
1976 0.584 0.644 0.693 0.739 0.490 0.217 0.343 0.531 0.035 89.393 76.640 
1977 0.635 0.683 0.729 0.756 0.485 0.213 0.339 0.533 0.033 88.484 75.900 
1978 0.680 0.714 0.763 0.778 0.486 0.211 0.342 0.542 0.034 88.609 76.920 
1979 0.722 0.745 0.782 0.795 0.489 0.213 0.344 0.550 0.032 88.274 76.120 
1980 0.767 0.797 0.808 0.801 0.493 0.216 0.345 0.564 0.036 84.686 76.080 
1981 0.802 0.847 0.830 0.819 0.492 0.216 0.347 0.595 0.056 83.990 75.930 
1982 0.855 0.892 0.880 0.844 0.511 0.215 0.368 0.598 0.079 82.090 75.480 
1983 0.890 0.917 0.898 0.872 0.541 0.222 0.396 0.634 0.097 83.660 76.360 
1984 0.898 0.936 0.905 0.915 0.528 0.221 0.382 0.651 0.097 82.206 74.240 
1985 0.915 0.957 0.918 0.922 0.518 0.220 0.369 0.631 0.087 77.091 72.090 
1986 0.939 0.959 0.949 0.934 0.507 0.220 0.359 0.624 0.084 76.923 70.680 
1987 0.954 0.961 0.956 0.933 0.508 0.216 0.364 0.617 0.085 75.689 69.790 
1988 0.964 0.967 0.973 0.952 0.504 0.215 0.360 0.614 0.084 74.842 68.960 
1989 0.971 0.978 0.989 0.980 0.495 0.204 0.359 0.612 0.077 71.793 66.900 
1990 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.471 0.205 0.327 0.574 0.070 70.100 64.960 
1991 1.042 1.032 1.014 1.009 0.474 0.212 0.324 0.578 0.066 70.276 64.590 
1992 1.091 1.063 1.031 1.009 0.483 0.214 0.332 0.586 0.067 70.127 64.510 
1993 1.125 1.085 1.038 1.011 0.483 0.214 0.333 0.583 0.077 74.276 63.670 
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
───── 
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